Polly J. Lund v. Orin L. Lund : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Polly J. Lund v. Orin L. Lund : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray S. McCarty; Sumner J. Hatch; Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lund v. Lund, No. 8707 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2872
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
POLLY J. LUND. 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs.- No. 8707 
ORIN L. LUND, 
Defendant and Respondent 
RAY S. McCARTY and 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
ST A'TEMENT OF THE CASE ----------------------------------------------------1-5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------------------5-11 
ARGUMENT: 
As to the law ------------------------------------------------------------------------11-16 
POINT 1 : The court did not erre in failing 1to make 
finding,s on the i~ssue of resumption of misconduct .. 16-18 
POINT 2 : The court did not err in finding a reconcilia-
tion. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------19-20 
POINT 3 : The court was correct in finding the recon-
ciliation was not conditional. ------------------------------------20-22 
POINT 4 : The court did not err in refusing to grant 
alimony and support money, and to hold defendant 
in contempt. ------------------------------------------------------------------22-24 
POINT 5 : The court did not err in failing to award 
attorney's fees for plaintiff. ------------------------------------------ 24 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------24-25 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
Angell v. Angell (Calif.), 191 P(2) 54 ________________________________________ 13,14 
Beezley v. Beezley, 5 U (2) 20, 296 P(2) 274---------------------------- 12 
Burchfield v. Burchfield (Wash.), 10·5 P (2) 286 ____________________ 14-15 
Griffiths v. Grif£iths, 3 U (2) 82, 278 P(2) 983 ____________________ 16,20 
Johnson v. J01hnson, 116 U. 27, 207 P(2) 1036 ________________________ 12,13 
Lane v. Superior Court (Caliri.), 285 P ( 2) 860________________________ 14 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 U. 573, 236 P(2) 1066 ______ 11,12,22 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 U. 574, 144 P(2) 528 ____________________ 23 
Smith v. Smith (Wash.), 269 P. 821. _______________________________________ 15-16 
TEXTS 
17 Am. Jur. 258, sec. 213 _________________ -------------------------------------------- 14 
17 Am. Jur., 365, ,sec. 44L ______________________________________________________________ 14 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Burns, R., "'The Tyrant Wife" ------------------------------------------------------ 22 
Pope, A., "Essay on Criticism" ------------------------------------------------------ 18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
POLLY J. LUND. 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs.- No. 8707 
ORIN L. LUND, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF 1THE CASE 
The parHes will be referred to as in the lower court. 
On the lOth day of September, 1953, Polly J. Lund 
filed a divorce suit against Orin L. Lund, showing the 
partie.s had been married s·ince Mareh 10, 1942, and had 
one son, J,ames, at that time seven years of age. The 
parties had acquired an equity in a home at 908 Mill-
creek Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, and they also had 
a mink operation valued at $5,000.00, and the comp1aint 
alleged an ·equity of $1,100.00 in certain real property 
in Salt Lake County, however the trial of the case showed 
there was no written evidence of this latter equity. The 
parties had two automobiles, a 1950 Buick and a 1946 
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Mercury, together with chattel property and furnishings 
in the home on "Millcreek Way. The husband, Orin, was 
then and now is a switchman on the Union Pacific Rail-
road and in addition is a pilot in the Utah National 
Guard. 
The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim, 
denying the amount of his earnings claimed by the plain-
tiff, .admitting the joint occupancy of the properties set 
forth in the complaint during the marriage. 
After s·everal days of interrupted trial, on the lOth 
day of February, 1954, Judge Martin l\1. Larson entered 
an interlocutory decree of divorce (R. 12-24), granting 
to Mrs. Lund the equity in the house, the mink operation 
in its entirety, one of the automobiles, all the house-
hold furnishings, variou.s insurance policies, and $115.00 
a month .alimony and child support, and granting to 
defendant one automobile, and the equity, if any, in the 
Salt Lake County property. 
On February 15, 1954, the defendant. through his 
.attorney filed a motion for new trial and to amend find-
ings and judgment (R. 25-26). On that same date ~Irs. 
Lund noticed the 1notion for hearing for February 23, 
195-l: (R. 27). Though no fonnal pleading was filed, the 
Ininute book ~hows the hearing was continued without 
date by stipulation of thP parties. An order to show 
canse for ehild visitation was filed for defendant by new 
eonnsel on .April 1-t-, 1954: (R. :2~). This nwtter w.as 
never heard. About the 11th day of ~fay, 195-!, the 
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parties reconciled and returned to the marital domicil. 
They resided there together happily as husband and wife. 
They had a joint bank account. They made payments 
on the house, paid mink expenses and living expenses 
from all sources of income including the defendant's 
checks from the railroad and the National Guard. They 
had sexual relations. They went out together socially, 
raised their son, James, and behaved in all respects as a 
normal wife and husband relationship, until September 
of 1955, when they again separated. 
Defendant's attorney in the interim had moved out 
of this jurisdiction, and apparently plaintiff's counsel 
was not cont·acted relative to setting -aside the interlocu-
tory decree. On October 12, 1955, the plaintiff procured 
an order to show cause for delinquent child support 
and alimony based on the decree (R. 29-32). On January 
18, 1956, plaintiff filed a motion noticing up for hearing 
defendant's motion for new trial and for amendment 
of findings and decree (R. 33). Appearances were made 
by counsel on these matters but the hearing was con-
tinued by Judge Martin ~f. Larson. 
On June 14, 1956, defendant noticed up a motion to 
set aside the interlocutory decree of February 10, 1954, 
for June 22, 1956 (R. 34-36). This motion was also put 
over without date by Judge Larson. On December 16, 
1956, plaintiff filed an order to show cause for alimony 
and support money, delinquent and future, set for De-
cember 22, 1956 (R. 36-39). Defendant filed a motion 
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to dismiss the order to show cause (R. 40-42) on the 
basis that defendant's motion to vacate the interlocutory 
decree had not been heard. Plaintiff filed an answer 
to this motion (R. 43-44). The court set all matters for 
hearing on December 22, 1956, and on that date heard 
the motion for new trial and to amend the findings of 
fact and decree of February 10, 1954, and denied said 
motions and refused to participate further in the case. 
On January 15, 1957, the court entered its order deny-
ing the motion for new trial and to amend the findings 
and decree, and reserved the matter of vacating the 
interlocutory decree, the various orders to show cause, 
and defendant's motion for a further hearing concerning 
the ehange in property status during the sixteen months 
of reconciliation to be heard before another judge (R. 
45-46). 
Defendant filed timely notice of appeal and desig-
nation of the record with regard to denial of the motion 
for new trial and amendment of findings and decree, 
but has not perfected his appeal because the matters 
pending before the district court had not yet been dis-
posed of, and Judge Harding's order of :Jiay 16, 1957, 
(R. 144) has n1ade the question of the interlocutory 
decree moot at this tin1e. 
A supplmnental order to show e.ause. together with 
defendant's motion of June 14. 195G. to vacate the inter-
locutory decree, were heard before Judge :J[aurice Hard-
ing on April 2~~, 1956. The issue of Yacation of the ori-
ginal decree due to sixteen 1nonths' reconciliation was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
heard first, and the other maHers reserved pending that 
decision. On May 14, 1957, after having received written 
briefs on the question of reconciliation by both parties, 
Judge Harding entered his memor.andum decision (R. 
141), and on May 19, 1957, the court entered findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order vaeating the 
interlocutory decree of February 10, 1954 (R. 142-144). 
Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing (R. 145), which 
was denied (R. 146), and on June 10, 1957, plaintiff 
appealed by filing notice of appe:al (R. 148) and im-
pecunious affidavit (R. 147), ~and her designation of the 
record on appeal (R. 149-150). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in plaintiff's brief is fragmen-
tary, to say the least, and as plaintiff has unduly empha-
sized certain testimony and entirely disregarded other 
important facts, the defendant is constrained to restate 
the facts in their entirety. 
The defendant, a switchman for the Union Pacific 
R.ailroad and also a pilot in the~ Ut1ah National Guard, 
was divorced by the plaintiff on February 10, 1954. They 
lived separate ~and apart until April or May of the same 
year, their only contact being legal sparring 1as appears 
supra. 
Aecording to her testimony, there were several meet-
ings, and one was with a church official. Discussion in 
that meeting, according to plaintiff, concerned defend-
ant becoming ~a good church member and going through 
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the temple so they could have their son, Jimmy, sealed 
to them. There was also discussion concerning pro-
phylatics and filthy handerkerchiefs and a eigaret lighter 
(part of the cruelty in the original case). Because of 
the saintliness of the counsellor, pilaintiff spared him 
the sight of the hankies at this meeting and the subse-
quent one (R. 56 and 79). The defendant's version is that 
he w~s oppor.tuned by the plaintiff to resume the marital 
relationship, and that he told her he would never con-
sider going back with her until she cleared his name 
and at least admitted to the lies she had told about 
him in the divorce aCJtion. She replied that when you 
go into court, you go in to win. He asked her about 
hiding the money, and she admitted she had given or 
loaned her brother more than $5,000.00 of the mink farm 
money. The church official at this meeting brought out 
the fact rthat he had had sons in the service and he knew 
prophylatics were issued, and he recommended that they 
live their own lives and move away from their folks, 
who had not recognized their marriage for years. 
They then went back together and resumed marital 
relations. 'They move!f into the hmne on :\Iillcreek \Yay 
(R. 108). From l\Iother's Day, 195±, until about Labor 
Day, 1955, they lived as husband and wife. They had 
a joint bank account and the defendant used his salary 
for the upkeep of the family and payn1ents on their 
obligations (R. 109), and he worked :around the place 
and on the nlink fann. They resumed their marital life 
as though there had been no divorce at all. According 
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to the plaintiff's own testimony, for thirteen months 
they lived happily together with their son (R. 58). Then, 
according to plaintiff, the cruelty of the defendant re-
commenced. 
The plaintiff has listed vanous ~acts of claimed 
cruelty, listing them from (a) to (p) inclusively in he-r 
brief. Practically every allegation was merely a sus-
picion or surmise. They are listed as absolute facts. 
As the defendant views the record, here is what she 
c1aims: 
1. Mother's Day, 1955 (Sunday): The defendant 
worked on the east "40", which belonged to his folks, 
and evidentally did not go to church (R. 60). 
2. The defendant failed to visit plaintiff 1n the 
hospital, but he did call her on the telephone (R. 61). 
3. He read the newspapers in bed (R. 61-62). 
4. Notwithstanding the plaintiff was not in favor 
of the defendant being in the N ationral Guard, in the 
middle of June, 1955, he went to Albuquerque for the 
Gu:ard, and the man that he went with had a bottle of 
liquor in his car (R. 62). 
5. He came home from Albuquerque looking as 
though he had been dragged through a knot hole (R. 63). 
6. Next day defendant acted stupid. 
7. Defendant came home heavily laden with perfume 
(R. 64). 
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8. Middle of July: Plaintiff found cigaretttes in 
defendant's car. (This prompted her to say: "Well, Orin, 
that f:act that you deceived me about the cigarettes brings 
back all the other things, and until you prove to me you 
mean what you say and until you prove to me that you 
can be a good, clean husband, I cannot be a wife to 
you".) (R. 65). 
9. He did not repent (R. 66). 
10. He received telephone calls. (She thought callers 
disguised their voice.s). (R. 67). 
11. In August, 1955, defendant went on Xational 
Guard encampment and took some good clothes with him. 
(This made her suspiscious.) (R. 68). 
12. P}aintiff claimed defendant returned from a 
flying trip to Cincinnati ; she said he ,,~as to be back 
Sunday morning but did not come hon1e until the wee 
hours of ~Ionday morning~ she claimed that he returned 
from piloting this plane in .a drunken condition. (She 
suspected he was having fun away fron1 hmne.) (R. 69). 
13. Labor Day, 1933: His clothes reeked of cigar-
ettes and liquor. 
1-l-. The same day the plaintiff found out that de-
fendant had a checking account in his own name with less 
than $100.00 in it (R. 70). 
1 G. Plaintiff, with the help of locksmiths, prowled 
defendant'8 a rm~r chest in the basenwnt and found old 
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army prophylatics and a letter dated the 22nd of Sep-
tember, 1946. (This enhanced her prying suspicions.) (R. 
72, 77, and 88). 
16. Plaintiff had dupli0ate keys made and prowled 
the defendant's wardrobe; found liquor and hankies (R. 
72-73). 
17. The day after Labor Day, 1955, or thereabouts, 
she claimed defendant struck her and also her mother 
and that he left home (R. 81). 
18. The worst blow of all: H-e failed to obtain a 
deed from his parents to the e:ast "40" to himself and 
plaintiff (R. 100). 
The parents of the plaintiff objeeted to the plain-
tiff and defendant going back together (R. 98). 
A.s to the hankies, Mrs. Berger, sister of the defend-
ant, testified that her deceased husband, a urologist in 
the service, in his lifetime had been the recipient of 
gifts from soldiers, and the hankies and Exhibit 45 
were among them. The plaintiff was not shocked when 
Mrs. Berger showed them to her, but, on the contrary, 
laughed at them. Later she gave these hankie.s and Ex-
hibit 45 to the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff was 
also very much interested in the hankies and Exhibit 
45, as appears from the record. He compelled Mrs. 
Berger to describe the hankies 'and oper;ate Exhibit 45 
in court (R. 103-105). 
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'The defendant testified that on Mother's Day of 
1954 until about September 6, 1955, he and the plain-
tiff 'Cohabited as man and wife, had joint bank accounts, 
both worked on the mink ranch, and that he made pay-
ments towards the house (R. 109), and that during that 
time he worked for the railroad from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. 
at night so he could work daytime on the mink ranch. 
In regard to the trip to Cincinnati, the defendant 
testified he took a rifle team to Cleveland, then flew 
to Fort Worth, Tex.as, picked up Doctor Parmalee and 
brought him back to Salt Lake City, and arrived here 
at approximately 3 :00 or 4 :00 in the morning. He was 
gone from Salt Lake City, total ground-to-ground 38 
hours, of which 28 hours and 4 minutes were in the air. 
According to defendant, there was no trouble whatso-
ever until he came back from Albuquerque. When he 
got hack, she had moved into the boy's bedroom and 
never came oock. 
He testified that the hankies given to him by his 
sister, Mr.s. Berger, were in his dresser drawer. As to 
the checking aecount, defendant had that checking ac-
count just after the divorce, and that when he went 
back to live with plaintiff. he told her about the checking 
account. There was $132.00 expense pay that was placed 
in the bank on January 7, 1955, and his salary checks 
all went into his and his wife's joint account (R. 116-120). 
The plaintiff soon after the reconciliation on ~lay 
14, 195+, deposited $698.50 in her own aceount, )Irs. 
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P. J. Lund (R. 92-93, Exhibit 44, bank book). The plain-
tiff .also loaned her brother $5,000.00 out of the mink 
farm money. This was prior to the divorce and was not 
mentioned by her in the divorce trial (R. 107 and 112). 
The lower court refused to allow the defendant to 
justify the assault on plaintiff and her mother right after 
Labor Day (R. 99). The plaintiff's attorney testified 
that in his opinion he was entitled to .a $750.00 fee. 
ARGUMENT 
As to the law 
There is a difference between (a) condonation that 
occurs after the filing of the complaint and before the 
decree, and (b) reconciliation after the interlocutory 
decree is entered. In situation (a) the court has all 
the facts before it at the time of entering .a de:cree, 
both ~s to grounds of divorce and equities in property 
settlement. In a condonation afte.r the interlocutory de-
cree is entered, as in this case, there is no provision 
to determine the change of equities at the time of any 
subsequent breakdown of the marriage. 
The plaintiff depends on the case of MacDonald vs. 
MacDonald, 120 U. 573, 236 P(2) 1066. In that case a 
divorce wa.s brought in 1948. That complaint was dis-
missed and the parties reconciled. Then the defendant 
resumed her misconduct and another suit for divorce 
was filed. The f.act that the 1948 complaint was dis-
missed and the parties reconciled did not condone her 
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prior conduct so as to wipe it out from con_sideration 
at the time of the trial of the second complaint. 
The case of Beezley vs. Beezley, 5 U(2) 20, 296 
P(2) 274, is a case where a divorce was filed on ,l\Iay 
8, 1952. The case was never brought to trial, and on 
July 17, 1953, defendant pleaded that the cruelty com-
plained of in plaintiff's complaint had been condoned. 
On the 19th of February, 1954, a supplemental complaint 
was filed alleging that the reconciliation on the part of 
the defendant was fraudulent and he had re_sumed his 
cruel treatment. The court held in this case the same 
as in the J.J!JacDonald case, supra. As in the M:acDonald 
case, this was a condonation prior to trial and inter-
locutory deeree. 
Counsel for plaintiff did not see fit to quote Johnson 
vs. Johnson, 116 U. 27, 207 P(2) 1036, wherein the court 
discusses a reconciliation and condonation after the inter-
locutory decree but before the decree became finaL and 
the court says: 
"Nevertheless, if a divorce decree can be set 
aside on the petition of both parties after the 
interlocutory 1)eriod has expired under statutes 
such as are found in Color•ado and Utah, then 
there seems to be no logical reason why the de-
cree eonld not be set .aside upon application of 
one of the parties, if actual resnn1ption of marital 
relations could be shown. The 1natter would re-
solve itself into one of proof.·· (P. 1038) 
And again on Page 1039 : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
"Similarly when the parties to a divorce pro-
ce·eding have resumed marital relations during 
the interloctuory period, and have notified the 
court to this effect, during the interloctuory 
period, it is the policy of the law and the view 
favored by public policy, that the court vacate 
the decree, so that it will appear of record that 
no divorce in fact was ever granted." 
The case goes on to say that if the interlocutory period 
is extended, that indicates the marriage is still in exist-
ence, and if .a showing is made before the decree has 
beeome final that the parties have resumed marital re-
lations, there will appear no divorce of re·cord, and all 
uncertainties would be resolved in favor of the exist-
ence of the marriage. 
The plaintiff quotes from Angell vs. Angell (Dist. 
Court of Appeals, 1st Dist., Calif., M.ar. 15, 1948), 191 
P (2) 54. In that case the interlocutory decree was granted 
on account of drunkenness. There was a written recon-
ciliation entered into, signed and acknowledged, an ex-
pres.s agreement that defendant would refrain from 
drinking for one year. This he did not do. His conduct 
became as bad or worse. This court reversed the trial 
court and held there was a resumption of the cruel 
treatment, and entered the final decree. The court how-
ever says on page 57 the California cases have estab-
lished the law to be as follows : 
"If a reconciliation based on .an unconditional 
forgiveness is effected before the entry of a final 
decree the trial court should deny such a de·cree 
to either party." 
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The above case was decided by a divided court. 
Justice Ward claimed the contract in the above case 
was void and made the following observation: 
"Such a contract would permit parties to 
enjoy marital relations for over eleven months 
and then upon the whim or caprice of one spouse 
·obtain a final decree irrespective of the declara-
tion of law or the views of the courts on the 
merits of the motion." 
Lane vs. Superior Court (Dist. Ct. App., Calif., 
March 5, 1930), 285 P ( 2) 860, quoted by the plaintiff, 
holds where wife has been granted an interlocutory de-
cree of divorce on account of fault of her husband and 
reconciliation has been effected and cohabitation re-
sumed for considerable length of time, court may exer-
cise discretion in granting or refusing final decree of 
divorce, .and in this case the final decree was denied. 
Plaintiff has cited 17 Am. J ur. 258, section 213, 
which deals with condonation, either pending the divorce 
action ·or during the divorce action. Section +±1. at page 
365, discusses the effect of cohabiting before the final 
decree, and says that condonation or reconciliation and 
resumption of marital relations .after the entry of an 
interlocutory de·cree will prevent the entry of a final 
decree of divorce sought by either party. 
Burchfield vs. Burchfield (Sup. Ct., "\Vash.), 105. 
P(2) 286, says, at page 288: 
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"A clear and concise statement of the mean-
ing of the phr8!se 'resumed the marital relation,' 
a.s it should be ,applied in the case at bar, is set 
forth in the quotation from the memorandum de-
cision of the learned trial court: 'From all the 
acts, conduct and practices of the parties the court 
is to determine whether there was a real intent, 
carried into execution, to resume the relations of 
husband and wife. If that can be found, then the 
final decree should be denied, since the parties 
should not be at liberty to change their minds 
a second time, and proceed on the basis of the 
action when it ha:s once be·en abandoned by an 
actual resumption of the marital relations'". 
Smith vs. Smith (Sup. Ot., Wash.), 269 P. 821, holds 
that if, after the entry of the interlocutory order, the 
parties resumed the marital relationship and lived to-
gether openly and travelled together, and held them-
selves out to the world as husband and wife, they have 
estopped themselves from availing themselves of the 
interlocutory order for the purpo.se of using it as a 
basis for a final deeree of divorce. To hold that they 
can resume the marital relation, as did the parties to 
this action, and then proceed to a final decree, would 
make a farce of judicial procedure and open the door 
to fraud; it would result in intolerable situations, and 
involve innocent children, creditors in good faith, to 
say nothing of the parties themselves, .and create an 
inextricable confusion, that could result in nothing but 
harm to all concerned. Quoting from that case, at page 
824: 
"If, after the entry of .such an order, the 
parties deliberately resume the marital status, and 
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live together openly .as husband and wife, whether 
or not they wish or intend to do away with the 
effect of the interlocutory order, the law must 
assume that they intended the reasonable conse-
quences of their act, and, in our opinion, the only 
conclusron which can follow is that the action for 
divorce has been abandoned and the interlocutory 
order, as the ba.sis for .a final decree, wholly done 
away with." 
The question of whether or not there was a recon-
ciliation, the question of whether it was conditional, and 
the question of whether the cruelty has been resumed 
to such an extent as to justify the entry of a decree are 
for the trial court to decide. As has been repeatedly 
s.aid by this court, a trial court has a better opportunity 
to view the witnes.ses and observe them on the stand, and 
the decision of the trial court should not be disturbed 
unless the evidence definitely shows that there was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 3 U (2) 82, 278 P(2) 983. 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO MAKE 
FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF RESUMPTION OF MISCON-
DUCT. 
Judge Harding could not have 1nade a finding of the 
resumption of misconduct. There was no n1isconduct. The 
plaintiff and defendant went back together again in 
May of 1954. They lived together in their hmne on :Mill-
creek Way. They had a joint bank account. They worked 
on the mink fann together, and the defendant used his 
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salary from the National Guard and from the railroad 
for the upkeep of the family. In addition to the National 
Guard and the railroad, he worked on the mink farm. 
He arranged his work on the railroad so that he had 
the shift from 3 :00 p.m. to 11 :00 p.m., to enable him 
to work on the mink farm. For over a year they lived 
together happily and harmoniously; in fact, the trial 
court asked her specifically whether there was anything 
to suggest to her that their marriage was not happy and 
harmonious between Mother's Day of 1954 and 1955. 
Her only objection was that he worked on Sunday on 
the east "40" and that she wanted a deed to the east 
"40". 'The court pressed his question and asked her: 
"Until that day, there had been nothing wrong from the 
time you went back together~" She said there had been 
a few things, but she accepted them, like flying and going 
to the Guard, but she answered the court that he was 
considerate of her during that period of time. (R. 99-100) 
Both of them held out to the world that they were hus-
band and wife, and so continued until after Labor Day of 
1955. 
Plaintiff and her counsel lay great stress on the 
defendant having a bank account containing less than 
$100.00, yet fail to mention the $5,000.00 that plaintiff 
loaned to her brother prior to commencing the divorce 
action. This plaintiff proclaims she hates lies yet fraud-
ulently kept this information from the trial court in 
the divorce action, and thus gained an unconscionable 
advantage in the property settlement. No mention was 
made in plaintiff's brief concerning plaintiff depositing 
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$698.50 in the account of P. J. Lund immediately after 
the reconciliation. 
From the testimony it is clear that this idea of 
building up eruelty came to her mind some time in the 
summer of 1955, when she finally decided she wanted 
no more of the defendant. No matter what the defendant 
did, no matter what he owned, to her mind was debasing. 
In every act of the defendant and in his every posses-
sion, she saw the possibility of infidelity, impiety and 
brutality, which brings to mind: 
"All seems infected that the infected spy, 
As all looks yellow to the jaundiced eye." 
"A. Pope - Essay on Criticism." 
If there was any cruelty, it was on the side of this 
carping, querilous, inquisitive and acquisitive plaintiff. 
The lower court was right. At the importuning of the 
plaintiff the parties effected a reconciliation. They lived 
together for over a year as man and wife. No thought 
was given to the divorce action. Plaintiff abandoned 
seeking a final de~cree. Defendant's 1notion for new trial 
was undisturbed. Just ho·w long do people have to stay 
together in this State in order to effect what is termed 
a reeonciliation prior to final decree' The lower court 
properly held that in this case there had been a full 
reconciliation for over a year. and the interlocutory 
decree should be set aside. Judge Harding properly held 
that he was not interested in the assault just after Labor 
Day of 1955. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
POINT 2. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A RECON-
CILIATION. 
The f.acts of this case clearly indicate the parties 
went back together to make a home, raise their son, and 
conduct the mink business. The plaintiff solicited this 
reconciliation. Up until that time the defendant was pro-
ceeding in his case by a motion for new trial to correct 
the inequities and injustices in the lower court's decree. 
The only condition to the reconciliation was the de-
fendant's demand that the plaintiff clear his name by 
admitting the lies she told in the divorce action and to 
straighten out the matter of concealed moneys. However, 
there was a condonation by both parties, and, as said be-
fore, they went back together and lived harmoniously for 
one ye.ar, when for some reason or other she began to 
dream up acts of cruelty. We do not admit the plaintiff 
claims that she condoned the wrongs of the defendant. 
We do not concede that the defendant had committed 
wrongs requiring condonation. All there is to it, these 
people started a divorce and then decided to go back to-
gether again, and they did go back together again and 
they lived together for over a year. A change in condi-
tions arose because of the reconciliation. According to 
all the cases cited by the plaintiff and the defendant, the 
reconciliation, coupled with the resumption of cohabita-
tion for a long period of time, ,amount to reconciliation 
or condonation sufficiently to justify the setting aside of 
the interlocutory decree. If either party had any com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
plaint against the other, they condoned it. Condonation 
does not mean that you go through a certain ritual or 
sign a pledge. What was their conduct after going back 
together if it was not condonation or reconciliation¥ 
The court was right. 
The Griffiths case, supra, also holds that provoca-
tion is a material fact for consideration in determining 
whether conduct of defendant _spouse constitutes cruelty. 
In the case at bar, neither party denies that there 
was a reconciliation. Plaintiff claims defendant was 
cruel to her; defendant denies this. Judge Harding, after 
hearing the evidence, determined that there was a con-
donation and reconciliation. 
POINT 3. 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THE RECON-
CILIATION WAS NOT CONDITIONAL. 
In .arguing this point the plaintiff has endea-\ored 
to show there were conditions. In the testilnony quoted 
on page 28 of plaintiff's brief, she Inentioned her desire 
along religiou.s lines and about both of then1 telling the 
truth. There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record 
that there was an express condition, saYe and except the 
defendant saying that he wanted her to clear Iris name 
and confess to her lies. If there were any conditions 
broken as to the truth, it is all on the part of the plain-
tiff. She did not clear up the $5,000.00 loan to her brother. 
which would have nmtPrially eh.anged the original inter-
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locutory decree of the trial court. As to the bank ac-
counts, she complained about his small one started prior 
to the reconciliation, but she does not think anything 
about her own .account with several hundred dollars in it 
started immediately after the reconciliation made in the 
name of P. J. Lund. (Exhibit 44). 
All through plaintiff's brief, she has attempted to 
find something on which to base cruelty, or as she terms 
it, resumption of cruelty, on the part of the defendant. 
In every respect this attempt has failed. It is almost 
like a person skinning a flea to ge~t its tallow. 
Plaintiff's counsel has brought up complaints that 
ordinarily would be laughed out of court. He has at-
tempted by the use of adjectives and .adverbs to paint 
every act into one of extreme cruelty. For example, at 
page 36 of plaintiff's brief, he would have the court 
believe that defendant beat his child. This is just one of 
the many misstatements and exaggerations of plaintiff's 
counsel. 
In reading plaintiff's brief, one would suppose that 
the plaintiff wa.s acting as a parol board imposing strict 
conditions; however, no parol board would ever go so 
far as to require conditions that came to plaintiff's mind 
not during the reconciliation but in the summer of 1955. 
A parol board would give .a parolee a hearing. This 
plaintiff did not do. She obtained a locksmith and search-
ed his chests that had been stored in the basement un-
opened since prior to the divorce action (R. 109-110). She 
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begrudged him having anything of his own. She wanted 
him to go to his folks and get a deed to the east "40". 
To call this unreasonable would be the understatement 
of the year. The condition that she wanted to place this 
defendant in is epitomized by the immortal Burns: 
"Curs'd be the man, the poorest wretch in life, 
The crouching vassal to the tyrant wife! 
Who has no will but by her high permis.sion; 
Who has not sixpence but in her possession; 
Who must to her his dear friend's secret tell; 
Who dreads a curtain lecture worse than hell!" 
* * * * * 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY, AND TO HOLD DE-
FENDANT IN CONTEMPT. 
This point is interesting. Here finally the real rea-
son for this protracted litigation comes to light. The 
plaintiff not only wanted her provisions in the original 
unconscionable decree of divorce to reyi·n:_~ but the plain-
tiff also wanted to wreek this 1nan by getting a judgment 
of .some $3,600.00. In desperation plaintiff in her brief 
quoted J.l!acDonald Y. JlacDouald, supra, where the court 
said the 1narriage was a wreek and the court should pro-
nouneP a benediction on it. That was all right in the 
l\faeDonald ea:"t'. which is entirely different frmn this 
one as is sho\Yn in the first part of our argu1nent. There 
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there were no new property rights to consider. In this 
case, there is the $5,000.00 that she loaned her brother 
and failed to divulge at the original hearing. There is the 
$3,600.00 for which they are trying to get a judgment 
against this defendant. There is also the enhanced value 
of the mink and real property from joint funds and ef-
forts for sixteen months. 
We concede that they probably never can get hack 
together again, but there can be a hearing in which all the 
facts can be brought out as to their property rights and 
obligations, and a fair .and decent divorce decree entered. 
If she has suffered during this interim, which the de-
fendant claims she has not, that fact can be taken into 
consideration. 
The plaintiff has quoted Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 
U. 574, 144 P(2) 528, in support of the f.act that she 
should get this $3,600.00. On page 530, this court held: 
"When the right to collect money under the 
terms of a decree has vested, it is not within the 
province of a court to divest such right, unle·ss the 
party who claims the right has acted in such a 
manner as to clearly prejudice the substantial 
rights of the party against whom the right is 
sought to be enforced." 
When the lower ·court set .aside the interlocutory 
decree in this case, he set aside all the provisions of the 
decree. The plaintiff has her remedy. She is in pos-
session of everything they ever worked for and accumu-
lated, both during their marriage, before and after the 
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reconciliation. In any sub:sequent trial she cannot be 
injured. All matters can be taken into consideration by 
the court in deciding what she is entitled to. 
POINT 5. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff and her counsel are not entitled to attor-
ney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
First, we will say we have not attempted to answer 
plaintiff's Supplemental Brief to which he refers, as we 
have not received it, but we do appreciate receiving 
notice that he is going to file it. 
Practically every order he obtained from the lower 
court judge:s was obtained without notice to the defend-
ant, and it is interes·ting to note that he got four orders 
by four different judges signed in this manner since the 
decision of Judge Harding. 
With apologies we refer to these matters outside of 
the record, and do so only because of appellate license 
indulged in b~· the plaintiff, and we will not be o\erly 
concerned when the court disregards these statements 
along with plaintiff's state1nents that are not included 
in the record before this court. 
w·e have no quarrel with the theory advanced b~· 
plaintiff that resun1ption of wrong conduct as a basis 
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for divorce revives the past misconduct. In this case 
there was a reconciliation or condonation during the 
interlocutory period and prior to final decree. What, if 
you please, is the length of the term of probation as 
plaintiff would seem to put it~ Judge Harding held one 
year was sufficient. According to plaintiff's theory, she 
could keep him on probation indefinitely with the right 
to revoke at will. 
Judge Harding was right. There was (a) a recon-
ciliation, ,and (b) plaintiff and defendant lived together 
as man and wife for sixteen months. This clearly justi-
fied the court in setting aside the interlocutory decree. 
This court in affirming the lower court will not harm 
the plaintiff in any way. All this court will do will be 
to deprive her of taking an unconscionable, unjust ad-
vantage of the defendant. 
We respectfully submit the lower court's ruling 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYS. McCARTY and 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
409 Boston Building 
S.alt Lake City 11, Utah 
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